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AN ANALYSIS OF MANEUVER COMBAT TRAINING CENTER TRAINING METHODOLOGY IN DEVELOPING OBJECTIVE FORCE LEADERS
The Army needs to redraw the map of its expert knowledge and then inform and reform its educational and developmental systems accordingly, resolving any debate over the appropriate expertise of America's Army Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins
TRANSFORMATION, THE REDRAWN MAP OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE
The Chief of Staff (CSA) of the Army's transformational portrait is the redrawn map generating the need for growth in expert and professional knowledge across the Army. The CSA has slowly revealed glimpses of this portrait and the Army has at last begun to identify with where it is headed in the future as a warfighting profession. However, this new map of expert knowledge lacks a charted course for the reforming of Army educational and developmental systems. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is valiantly attempting to find its azimuth on the transformational map in hopes of reforming educational and developmental systems that will ensure the Army remains on azimuth and more importantly has a means of self-correcting its course on this new map. To date TRADOCs knowledge and expertise producing approaches are not fully developed nor reinforced through systematic coaching, teaching and mentoring in the field Army, and therefore the Army as a warfighting profession is in danger of not being transformed but further deformed as it searches for its objective force expertise.
The Army's current educational and developmental deformities are a result of an Army that has attempted to perform in a new stability and support environment on a cold war map of expert knowledge. In particular, the officer corps educational and developmental systems remain fixed on the Berlin Wall or a Line in the Sand. Occasional sprinkling of contemporary environmental training methodologies are applied as a band-aid approach in an attempt to patchwork the expert knowledge of those who will perform these missions. The post-Cold War expansion of the Army's professional jurisdiction has created a gap between the knowledge that its officers receive during their professional military education and the professional knowledge they need to effectively complete the missions that are being assigned in today's contemporary operational environment. 1 Thus, the evolution of a deformed expert knowledge base, because the Army has not conclusively determined the new scope and boundaries; it has not holistically redrawn the map of its expert knowledge.
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The Army is now overlaying the full spectrum environment on top of the same old archaic outdated cold war map as if this operational concept was a piece of maneuver acetate that will describe its axis on the map of professional expertise. Thinking on acetate is good as long as the correct map is used across the Army in a unity of effort. TRADOC needs to focus on the CSA's objective force and produce supporting and synchronized overlays that will expedite unity of effort. If the Army does not change map sheets and develop, distribute and digest supporting educational and developmental maneuver graphics then it will continue to deform the CSA's vision of the objective force. As an integral functional proponent in the development of the Transformation Campaign Plan of 2015, TRADOC needs to take the lead as the educational and training "Superintendent" of all its learning centers and develop milestones, inchstones and timelines that will resolve the debate of the Army's expertise.
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THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SPECTRUM
Before delving into the depths of how the Army pursues an expert knowledge, it is necessary to first define education and training terminology. Col Harry Summers summed up the difference between the education and training when he stated, "You can train for the known, for the unknown you educate."
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Further literature survey reveals that training is the building in of information and progressive repetition of tasks to develop skills and proficiencies. 5 Training is focused on what the student is expected to do; education emphasizes what the student is expected to know.
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Training quantifies proficiency, but we educate to stimulate to expand perspectives to enhance judgment, to allow and encourage flexibility to deal with the unexpected and to indeed shape the unexpected. 7 Indeed training and education are often used interchangeability and synonymously. Training emphasizes the DO of the Army's BE, KNOW, DO leadership mantra.
Education emphasizes the KNOW of the Army's leadership mantra. This work's focus is where training and education achieve overlap across the spectrum of education and training. This overlap occurs within the BE element of the Army leadership mantra.
ARMY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IMPLIES LEARNING
The presupposition of the second of nine concluding Snider and Watkins statements (as highlighted at the beginning of this work) from their professionalism study is that the Army is a learning organization. More importantly, they assert that through education and training the Army will more effectively transform as a profession. But is the Army truly a learning organization? Are the lessons the Army is learning facilitating the CSA's transformational vision and subsequent development of its future leaders? LTC Stephen Gerras does not believe the Army is a learning organization when he states, "If a learning organization is framed as a change in the structure leadership and interaction norms of the organization in order to better achieve a quest for accurate and new knowledge, the alternative is to remain on our current path of slow, incremental change that is focused on the periphery of the organization and involves a decision making process that thrives on the status quo." 8 Gerras argues that the Army will become a learning organization if it focuses more on the reinforcing mechanism as opposed to the embedding mechanism of structure and leadership changes. Reinforcing mechanisms reach deeper into an organization and effect and ensure change within. tasks. This is a reactive approach to learning as opposed to the proactive nature the CSA envisions. It works, but does it solve the immediate challenge of building a body of knowledge amongst our leaders in advance of, or in the midst of, an environmental shift in warfighting?
Researchers at the Army Research Institute sum up the need for the Army to be proactive in developing its professional expertise stating, "If we are to transform the Army during this decade, we will need to validate training approaches that accompany, not trail, the implementation of new warfighting technologies and the tactics that they will bring."
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So, how will the Army arrest its educational deformities and become proactive in developing learning methodologies as it strives to truly become a learning institution? LTC Paul
Reoyo says it best when he states for the Army to become a learning organization and to develop the objective force leader "requires commitment on the part of the Army and its leaders.
The Army must commit to be a learning organization that institutionalizes the organizations learning philosophy and provides the resources necessary to foster continuous education, training and leader development for our future leaders. "Leader Development and Soldiers are inextricably linked on our path to The Objective Force. Adaptive and self-aware leaders are essential to the employment of the Objective Force. Leadership training will focus on developing skill sets using experiential vice process-oriented training. It will be adaptable, and flexible to prepare the soldiers at every level to assume a leadership role at echelons above their own. TRADOC will modify leader educational models to prepare future leaders for full spectrum operations at the combined arms, joint, and strategic levels." The CTC vision supports multidimensional training centers leveraging technology to prepare the best Army in the world for the full-spectrum operations. It maintains the qualitative edge in warfighting, preserving the warrior ethos during a period of strategic transition. The CTC's will support achievement of Joint Vision 2010, Army Vision, and Army Transformation goals by providing an operational environment, where our capabilities-based Army will train to achieve advanced, full spectrum dominance throughout the operational and tactical levels of warfare against a freethinking, opportunities based Opposing Force.
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Below are the CTC Mission statements for comparison and contrast against the vision statement above:
CMTC Mission Statement: The CMTC, in a forward deployed environment at Hohenfels, Germany, provides realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing soldiers, leaders and units for success on current and future battlefields. The CMTC trains up to a task organized brigade combat team and selected divisional maneuver assets across the entire spectrum of conflict from high intensity to stability and support operations. What is not mentioned in any of them and should be is the development of objective force warfighting traits across the spectrum of conflict. They should address their training methodology and supporting reinforcing mechanisms that will ensure units will learn against the entry-level skills the leaders and units possess upon arriving the CTC. An example of a proposed revised OPSGRP mission statement is as follows: CTC OPSGRP mission is to provide realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing objective force leaders and soldiers across the full operational spectrum. OPSGRP executes its mission by observing and controlling training events for the purpose of assisting field commanders in achieving prerotational identified training objectives, which are realistically based on current unit warfighting proficiencies. OPSGRP observations will be addressed via operational reviews before, during and after mission sets via formal and informal teaching, coaching and mentoring sessions against objective force warfighting skill, knowledge and attribute competencies.
So, after this lengthy scrutiny of CTC missions, the question comes to mind, so what?
The point is, the CSA expects TRADOC to be the executive agent over the CTC's in modifying an educational and training methodology that will focus on developing leader skill sets using experiential vice process-oriented training that will produce adaptable and self-aware leaders. If TRADOC is to accomplish this mission then it must have full authority over the CTC's with all other MACOMs in support. Full authority to require that each CTC OPSGRP is trained and accredited in all its training methodologies from developing training scenarios and training each O/C on how to control the seven forms of contact to ensure leaders learn adaptability and self awareness skill sets through timely and responsive feedback systems. If TRADOC expects its proponent educators and trainers to operate off the same map of expert knowledge then it needs to clarify its command relationships both amongst its brother MACOMs and more importantly within its own command.
Currently the CTC's are the primer learning and leadership proving grounds in name only.
They are living on their past after action reviews. They continue to operate off the cold war map • What their personal role / function / responsibilities are per circumstance.
• How the basis of their commandership, leadership, general authority and credibility may vary per situation.
• The interpersonal skills needed at a particular moment / in a particular circumstance.
• What are their personal shortfalls per situation / environment / interference with certain players.
• How they are being viewed by all players in their battlespace.
• How they need to see / view the situation at hand.
• The varying command and leadership principles, concepts, TTPs they must embody and employ all of which may vary according to a broad range of circumstances they might find themselves in down the road.
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For adaptive leaders, his findings describe such leaders as one who can lead and manage in fast-paced operations in a changing environment. Adaptive leaders posses the following six traits. Adaptive leaders are…
• Comfortable with ambiguity.
• A team builder and trainer.
• Accelerated -passionate learner.
• Flexible and innovative. Willing to try different approaches.
• Highly developed conceptual skills. Can view a problem from multiple perspectives.
• Tactical expert-technically proficient.
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The self-aware common thread woven throughout LTC Prevou's research is the ability of the objective force leader to sense and manage his internal strengths and weaknesses in relation to the external pressures and circumstances acting upon him and his decision making process. The adaptive common thread is the ability of the objective force leader to make the right mission decision in a complex, dynamic, uncertain and ambiguous environment. 
FIGURE 2. OBJECTIVE FORCE LEADER DIFFERENCES
and emotional. Self-awareness and adaptiveness are the only two that are defined. Selfawareness refers to the extent that a leader is conscious of his identity, understands his emotions, strengths, weaknesses, needs, drives, as well as understands how these effect others. Adaptability refers to the leader's ability to achieve success in situations of uncertainty, quickly make sense of complex environments, provide creative solutions in ambiguous situations and help others as well.
36
Reviewing these competency based SKAs it is important to note that CTC's currently are involved in coaching, teaching and mentoring in only the tactical, technical competencies. The average O/C does not endeavor nor is he required and for that matter trained to delve into other competencies, especially those competencies that deal with other than technical and tactical expertise. The above average O/C may touch upon the others competencies but it is not the norm and it certainly is not codified.
For the CTC's to develop such leaders' competencies there must be significant changes to the CTC training methodologies within OPSGRPS. These changes must be founded upon multiple observation opportunities in the form of SKA contacts, much more than those created by chance today. These should be anticipated learning engagements across the seven forms of contacts or even warfighting friction and stresses within units. These contact observations must be multiple in nature for the leaders' O/C counterpart to coach, teach and mentor while assisting the leader in seeing, developing and changing his SKA leadership composite. Therefore, a battery of contacts enables the O/C to collaboratively build his counterparts objective force leadership competence composite for use in constant post rotation self-examination. This methodology ensures the leader develops actual combat experience vignettes built upon mental vignettes practiced at home station.
The CTC's must change their current training methodologies to create, encourage and facilitate the multiple contacts under a collaborative effort between the O/C and the leader.
Currently, the CTC training methodologies can best be described, as que-sera-sera, what will be, will be. This is because CTC's emphasize the word AFTER action in the review process too much. To do so causes learning opportunities to be lost and not transfer from home station mental vignettes to operational combat vignettes. Reinforcing mechanisms must be crafted and validated to provide O/Cs the opportunity to conduct formal and informal operational reviews within the before, during and after mission cycle. O/Cs must be trained and systematically permitted to control scenarios throughout this mission cycle to ensure multiple contacts with leaders throughout the unit to prevent repetitive and immature mission failure. Assisting the unit in achieving realistic training objectives in the midst of these contacts should be a key part of the O/C training ethic. To do so otherwise steals away soldier and leader tacit learning experiences and degrades as opposed to upgrading objective force leader competencies.
Admittedly, this CTC's transformational study goes against the current O/C training ethic and therefore is expected to be readily rejected by the CTC OPSGRP's. OPSGRP's internally operate within a mindset of if it "isn't broke then don't fix it," the exact antithesis of the transformational message. New training methodologies may require the CTC's to divorce themselves in part from the comfort and constant of three generations of proven training methodology. However, each CTC OPSGRP needs to look internally and remember leaders at all levels have a critical role in the Army's attainment of the objective force and must work to overcome the inertia that impedes progress.
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SKA COMPETENCY BASED CTC's
While it is understood that CTC training foundations will endure, the objective force will need new and innovative approaches to the use of theses capabilities to meet the new training challenges.
38 For the CTC's to join the transformational process they must reform three critical approaches of the CTC experience. CTC's must address scenario development, O/C collaborative involvement in controlling training and the AAR process.
Training scenarios need to design anticipated contacts so that these nine SKA competencies will come to fruition. The purpose of a scenario may not purely be a tactical mission but also to deliberately and specifically produce or enhance the SKA set of leaders.
Current scenario development at the CTC's considers leader development a byproduct of the tactical and technical engagements. This must change if the emphasis of SKA competencies apply equal weight to the BE, KNOW and DO mantra of leadership as opposed to today's CTC scenario emphasis on KNOW and DO. This BEing element of leadership will require scenarios manipulation in the midst of a rotation. It will also require training objectives to be reviewed more often in the midst of a rotation and if they are not being met due to repetitive mission failure then scenarios must be adjusted.
Repetitive mission failure, as occurs most often at today's CTC is the enemy of competency based training. Repetitive mission failure hardens the leaders' heart towards his SKA set. When a leader is not able to self examine his SKA set because the scenario or, the mission prematurely comes to closure, his map of expert knowledge is not expanded and there is very little learning occurring. This is not to suggest that tough realistic training at the CTC's should be abandoned. Transforming scenario development at the CTC's does mean that a units' current SKA competencies should be included in scenario development and management
and not merely to be determined by engineered train wrecks. CTC's should be developing scenarios that require higher order cognitive skills that enable leaders to adjust and adopt their thinking and tactical decisions to rapidly changing operational situations and conditions.
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To reiterate, this means the CTC's need to get as many leaders into the fight as often as possible. CTC's need to abandon and avoid scenarios that continually attrite and repeat previous failures mission to mission to mission. Repetitive mission failure scenarios only serve to feed the endless litany of negative trends. CTC's need to rethink how they can contribute to trends reversal via scenario development and management. An example may be that the CTC's do away with the one-size fits all 14-day force on force rotations. Instead rotations are designed to fit the unit being trained based on their SKA skill sets and training objectives. To achieve this senior leaders responsible for approving scenarios need to provide CTC's with realistic training objectives instead of the traditional defend, movement to contact and attack menu approach. Scenario developers must know the brigades unblemished SKA competency profile so as to develop reinforcing mechanisms to stretch the unit in a deliberate manner. This approach will allow scenario management to be based on a series of decision points predetermined and refined throughout the rotation. These decision points enable senior leaders observing the rotation to consult with senior trainers and leaders within the organization and to collaboratively assess and determine the direction of future scenario throughout the rotation.
This means that rotations are fluid and may change course for efficient and effective learning to occur.
A critical element to the flexibility in scenario execution as described above is the teaching of O/Cs how to anticipate and recognize opportunities to control and then observe SKA contacts. This means they must know the qualities of the SKA competencies in detail and at advanced levels so they will know when and how to shape and control SKA inserts. In the SKA 
OBSERVATIONS FROM OUT OF THE BOX
As a major part of this study I was determined to capture CTC "in the box" leader training Leavenworth, Kansas does not have any on-going initiatives to change the current AAR methodology used at the Combat Training Centers and Army-wide," and "Your proposed research paper will examine a relevant and timely topic and with your O/C experience, I'm sure you will be addressing this from a unique operational perspective." 44 In fact the only study remotely related to this subject is the 1999 General Accounting Office study on CTC's and Military Readiness. 45 The time has come to balance CTC practices with transformational beliefs. CTC's can change, just as they have changed the Army for the last thirty years. This work is just an effort in that direction.
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